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Abstract 
 
We examine the relation between a borrowing firm’s ownership structure and its choice of debt source 
using a novel, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership, control and debt structures for 9,831 firms 
in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010.  We find that the divergence between control rights and cash-flow 
rights of a borrowing firm’s largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the firm’s choice between 
bank debt and public debt.  A one-standard-deviation increase in the divergence reduces the borrowing 
firm’s reliance on bank debt financing (measured by the ratio of bank debt to total debt) by approximately 
23%.  The effect of the control-ownership divergence on borrowing firms’ debt choice is more 
pronounced for firms with high financial distress risk, firms that are informationally opaque, and firms 
that are family-controlled.  Moreover, this effect is weakened by the presence of multiple large owners 
and in countries with strong shareholder rights.  In addition, we find that the control-ownership 
divergence affects other aspects of debt structure such as debt maturity and security.  Overall, our results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights 
choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from 
bank monitoring. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Why do some firms borrow mainly from arm’s length investors such as public bondholders 
while others rely much more on informed financial intermediaries such as banks as their debt 
providers?  This is an important question as both bank loans and public bonds are major sources 
of global corporate financing.1  Existing corporate theories provide various explanations for the 
benefits and costs of using bank debt versus public debt (e.g., Diamond, 1984, 1991; Fama, 1985; 
Rajan, 1992; Park, 2000).  Yet, despite the theoretical and empirical importance of credit markets, 
there is only limited evidence on the determinants of the choice between private and public debt 
financing.  For instance, using a panel data set of 250 publicly listed firms in the U.S., Houston 
and James (1996) investigate the relation between a firm’s growth opportunities and its mix of 
private and public debt claims.  More recently, Denis and Mihov (2003) examine the link 
between a firm’s credit quality and its choice of debt source.  Most of the existing studies focus 
on firms in the U.S. and explore firm financial characteristics as potential factors influencing 
firms’ debt choices.  In this paper, we focus on the ownership structure of borrowing firms.  
Specifically, we explore the effect of the divergence between ownership and control on debt 
choice using a unique, hand-collected international panel data set that covers more than 9,800 
firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. 
Existing theories on ownership structure and corporate debt financing choice offer different 
views on the relation between firm control-ownership divergence and the choice between bank 
debt and public debt.  On the one hand, compared to public debt holders, banks have significant 
comparative advantages in monitoring efficiency due to access to private information as insiders 
(Fama, 1985).  Superior access to information enables banks to detect expropriation or 
opportunistic activities by controlling shareholders and corporate insiders and, accordingly, to 
                                                            
1 Using the year 2009 as an example, international syndicated lending alone amounted to $1.8 trillion and, 
meanwhile, corporations borrowed another $1.5 trillion in international bond markets (Chui et al., 2010). 
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punish the offending borrowers either by liquidation or through renegotiation (Park, 2000).  As a 
consequence, bank monitoring reduces moral hazard problems and provides borrowers strong 
incentives to make appropriate corporate decisions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983; Rajan, 1992).  In 
contrast, the diffuse ownership of public debt and the resulting free rider problems weaken 
individual bondholders’ incentives to engage in costly monitoring (Diamond, 1984 and 1991).  
Even if many bondholders were willing to monitor, the monitoring itself would be inefficient as 
it would involve wasteful duplication of monitoring efforts and costs (Houston and James, 1996).  
In short, the combination of concentrated holdings, credible threats, and superior access to 
information makes banks much more effective monitors than public bondholders in deterring 
potential self-interested or self-dealing activities. 2   Therefore, controlling shareholders and 
corporate insiders are less likely to be able to extract private benefits at the expense of other 
shareholders under bank monitoring (Hoshi et al., 1993).  From this perspective, firms with 
greater monitoring needs (e.g., those with greater agency problems) should borrow privately 
from banks while firms with lower monitoring needs should borrow more from arm’s length 
public investors (Houston and James, 1996; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  Since the divergence 
between ownership and control induces significant agency problems between large shareholders 
and other investors (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1999), it follows that there should be a positive 
relation between corporate control-ownership divergence and the borrowing firm’s reliance on 
bank debt.3  
On the other hand, controlling shareholders’ incentives to engage in expropriation activities 
and elude monitoring may imply the opposite relationship between the control-ownership 
divergence and firm debt choice.  The literature on corporate ownership structure documents 
                                                            
2 This is consistent with evidence based on stock market reactions documented in James (1987), which shows 
that the stock market reacts more positively to firm announcements of bank loans than to announcements of public 
debt offerings. 
 
3 It is possible that the link between control-ownership divergence and bank debt reliance weakens when bank 
debt accumulates to a certain level beyond which banks’ incremental monitoring incentives get smaller.  We explore 
this possibility in Section 3.3.2. 
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widespread divergences between the control and cash-flow rights of dominant shareholders.  
These divergences arise from the use of pyramid ownership structures, multiple control chains, 
and dual-class shares in many public firms around the world (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; 
Claessens et al., 2000).  In such firms, the high control rights enable the controlling shareholders 
to engage in various self-dealing activities to divert corporate resources for private benefits while 
the low cash-flow rights expose the controlling shareholders to very limited direct financial costs 
of such activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000). 4   Consequently, the 
tunneling incentives in these firms increase with the wedge between control rights and cash-flow 
rights.  Tunneling activities by controlling shareholders heighten the risk of financial distress and 
default, impair collateral value, and increase expected bankruptcy costs.  Taking these agency 
costs into account, banks are more likely to impose particularly strong monitoring on borrowing 
firms with large divergences between ownership and control.5   In anticipation of the strict 
monitoring by banks, firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights might 
prefer public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating 
themselves from bank monitoring (Houston and James, 1996; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  These 
considerations, therefore, suggest a negative relation between corporate control-ownership 
divergence and a borrowing firm’s reliance on bank debt.   
The overall effect of the borrowing firm’s control-ownership divergence on its choice 
between bank debt and public debt is an empirical question that we explore in this paper.  To 
investigate this, we construct a new, hand-collected large data set on corporate ownership 
structure and debt structure for more than 9,800 publicly listed firms across 20 East Asian and 
West European countries during the period 2001-2010.6  Using this large international data set, 
                                                            
4 Examples of these activities include asset sales, asset and cash flow transfers, inter-corporate loans, and 
investment activities that generate private benefits for the controlling shareholders while harming firm performance 
as well as the interests of other investors (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2000 and Djankov et al., 2008). 
 
5 Indeed, Lin et al., (2012) find strong evidence that banks form syndicates with structures that facilitate 
monitoring when the control-ownership divergence is large. 
 
6 We focus on these East Asian and Western European countries because it has been documented that the 
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we find strong evidence that is consistent with the bank monitoring avoidance hypothesis.  Our 
results indicate that firms with wider divergences between controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
and cash-flow rights tend to rely more heavily on public debt financing and less on bank debt 
financing.  The effect is not only statistically significant but also economically significant.  A 
one-standard-deviation increase in the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate owner of the borrowing firm, or the control-ownership wedge, reduces the 
firm’s reliance on bank debt financing (measured by the ratio of bank debt to total debt) by 16 
percentage points, ceteris paribus.  This is an economically significant effect given the sample 
average bank debt to total debt ratio of 71%.  Consistently, an increase in the control-ownership 
wedge significantly increases the firm’s reliance on public debt financing.  Our baseline results 
support the argument that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights 
choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding bank scrutiny and monitoring.  
We further test the monitoring avoidance hypothesis by investigating whether the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and debt choice is influenced by factors that affect 
controlling shareholders’ incentives to evade monitoring.  The negative effect of the control-
ownership divergence on borrowing firms’ reliance on bank debt (i.e., the monitoring avoidance 
effect) should be particularly strong in situations where the control-ownership divergence is 
more likely to result in intensive bank monitoring.  Moreover, the effect should also be enhanced 
in the presence of factors that increase dominant shareholders’ tunneling incentives and, as a 
result, their incentives to avoid bank monitoring.  Specifically, we examine five factors: firm 
financial distress risk, information opacity, family ownership, the presence of multiple large 
shareholders, and the strength of shareholder rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
control-ownership divergence is prevalent and has significant effects on firm value among firms in these countries 
(e.g., Claessens et al., 2000).  Following Houston and James (1996), we focus on publicly listed firms because these 
firms are most likely to find public debt financing feasible and thus most likely to confront the choice between bank 
debt and public debt. 
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We find that firms with high financial distress risk and firms with high degrees of 
information opacity tend to rely more on bank debt financing.  These effects are consistent with 
the major advantages of bank debt financing over public debt financing highlighted in the 
existing literature.  These advantages include renegotiation efficiency and re-contracting 
flexibility during financial distress, low-cost information production, and the ability to price 
claims that are hard for public investors to value in firms with high levels of information 
asymmetry (e.g., Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Gilson et al., 1990; Thakor and Wilson, 1995; 
Hadlock and James, 2002; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  More important, we find that firm financial 
distress risk and information opacity strengthen the negative relation between the control-
ownership wedge and bank debt reliance.  Since financial distress risk and information opacity 
raise controlling shareholders’ tunneling incentives and at the same time increase the expected 
monitoring from banks (e.g., Campello et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012), controlling shareholders’ 
incentives to elude monitoring also increase.  This results in a more pronounced effect of control-
ownership divergence on debt choice.  To state this differently, the presence of control-
ownership divergence weakens the positive links between financial risk and bank debt reliance 
and between information opacity and bank debt reliance because of controlling shareholders’ 
sharpened incentives to avoid bank scrutiny.   
With respect to ownership identity, tunneling incentives are likely to be particularly strong 
when a firm’s controlling shareholder is an individual or a family because the private benefits of 
control are not diluted among many unrelated investors (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
Consequently, family-controlled firms may have heightened incentives to avoid bank monitoring.  
Consistent with the monitoring avoidance hypothesis, we find that the effect of control-
ownership divergence on firm debt choice is larger for family-controlled firms.  
In contrast, we find that the relation between control-ownership divergence and debt choice 
is weakened by the presence of multiple large shareholders and in countries with strong 
shareholder rights.  Having other large owners and strong shareholder rights reduces the 
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tunneling incentives of the controlling shareholder (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005; La Porta et al., 
1998; Djankov et al., 2008).  As a result, the controlling shareholder’s incentive to avoid bank 
monitoring is also reduced, resulting in a lesser impact of the control-ownership wedge on bank 
debt reliance.   
We conduct a battery of ancillary tests to rule out alternative explanations and verify the 
robustness of our results.  While our results are consistent with dominant shareholders avoiding 
bank monitoring due to their tunneling incentives, controlling shareholders may also have 
incentives to prop up a financially distressed firm using transfers from other firms under their 
control in order to preserve their options to expropriate profits of this specific firm in the future 
(e.g., Friedman et al., 2003).  In such cases, firms with controlling shareholders might also find 
bank debt less attractive because the benefits of bank debt financing during financial distress 
such as renegotiation efficiency and re-contracting flexibility (e.g. Gilson et al., 1990; Denis and 
Mihov, 2003) become less valuable.  We therefore control for a borrowing firm’s potential of 
being propped up and test the robustness of our main results.  Specifically, we construct 
measures of a borrowing firm’s propping potential based on the value of the assets of all firms 
that are positioned underneath the firm in the ownership chain and could potentially be used to 
prop it up (Lin et al., 2011).7  Our main findings remain economically and statistically significant 
after controlling for borrowing firms’ propping potentials.  We also repeat the baseline 
regressions in the subsample of firms likely to have little or no potential of being propped up (i.e., 
firms at the bottom of the ownership chain) and find highly robust results.  In addition, we 
exclude firms with no controlling shareholders and focus on only firms that have controlling 
shareholders to explore whether the control-ownership divergence still has any explanatory 
power for debt choice in this subsample of firms that are all subject to potential propping.  We 
                                                            
7As documented in the ownership literature (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2002), controlling shareholders are most 
likely to transfer capital and resources from firms in which they have low cash-flow rights (i.e., firms low down in 
the ownership chain) to prop up firms in which they have high cash-flow rights (i.e., firms high up in the ownership 
chain). 
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continue to find that the control-ownership wedge exerts a significant and negative impact on 
firm’s bank debt reliance.  
In another set of tests, we investigate whether the level of existing bank debt in a firm’s debt 
structure affects the relation between control-ownership divergence and debt choice.  While an 
increase in financial stake and thus credit exposure in the borrowing firm enhances banks’ 
incentives to exert effort in due diligence and monitoring (Sufi, 2007), it is possible that for firms 
with high levels of bank debt, the change in bank monitoring may not be very sensitive to the 
change in the control-ownership wedge because these firms are already subject to strict bank 
monitoring.  Consequently, the effect of control-ownership divergence on debt choice may be 
less pronounced when bank debt accumulates to a certain level beyond which banks’ incremental 
monitoring incentives get smaller.  Indeed, we find that the link between the control-ownership 
wedge and bank debt reliance weakens for firms with high levels of bank debt. 
Another issue that we address concerns the possibility that some unobserved or omitted 
factor may drive both a firm’s ownership structure and its debt choice, thus biasing our findings.  
We employ several different methods to address this potential concern.  First, we include country 
and industry fixed effects as well as year interaction (e.g., country×year) fixed effects in our 
regressions to control for time-invariant and time-varying factors that may affect both ownership 
structure and debt choice.  Second, we perform change regressions to explore the effect of a 
change in a firm’s ownership structure on the change in the firm’s debt choice.  Examining 
changes helps to control for time-invariant omitted factors that might be driving the results.  
Third, we test the robustness of our results using instrumental variable analyses.  The empirical 
results from all of these additional tests are highly robust.  We find that a firm’s ownership 
structure continues to significantly influence its debt choice after accounting for the potential 
issue of endogeneity.   
In addition to debt source, we also explore the impact of control-ownership divergence on 
other aspects of debt structure such as debt maturity and security.  The tunneling and monitoring 
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avoidance incentives of the controlling shareholders might also affect debt maturity and security 
for two reasons.  First, short-maturity debt increases monitoring intensity since the borrowing 
firm is subject to more frequent scrutiny by creditors, underwriters, and rating agencies at 
issuance or renewal (Stulz, 2000; Datta et al., 2005).  Similarly, having collateral increases 
creditors’ monitoring incentives.  This is because collateral enables creditors to garner higher 
returns from monitoring when the borrowing firm is in distress (Rajan and Winton, 1995; Park, 
2000).  In anticipation of the intensive monitoring induced by short maturity and high security 
requirements, firms controlled by large shareholders with tunneling incentives would prefer to 
insulate themselves by choosing a debt structure with long maturity and low levels of 
collateralization (Datta et al., 2005).  Second, as has been widely documented in the literature, 
bank debt on average has a much shorter maturity (e.g., Tufano, 1993; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; 
Johnson, 1997; Park, 2000) and is more often secured by collateral (e.g., Gilson and Warner, 
2000) than public debt.  Given our main finding that firms with wider control-ownership 
divergence tend to rely more on public debt and less on bank debt, we would also expect the 
control-ownership wedge to be positively related to debt maturity and negatively related to debt 
security.  Our empirical results are highly consistent with our expectations.  We find that the 
control-ownership divergence significantly affects borrowing firms’ debt maturity and security: 
firms with larger control-ownership wedges tend to have debt with longer maturities and lower 
levels of collateralization. 
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature.  The primary contribution to the debt 
choice literature is to show that the control-ownership divergence has a first order effect on a 
borrowing firm’s debt structure.8  To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to report evidence on 
this effect.  Taken together, our findings show that the monitoring avoidance incentives caused 
by the control-ownership divergence play an important role in determining firm debt choice.  
Our paper also contributes to the ownership structure literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; 
                                                            
8 See Kale and Meneghetti (2010) for a recent survey of this literature. 
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Claessens et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2012) by presenting a new insight on how elements of corporate 
ownership structure exacerbate large shareholders’ moral hazard problems, influence firm 
financial decisions, and shape corporate policies.  In addition, the paper adds to the law and 
finance literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008) by showing how law and 
institutions mitigate the impact of controlling shareholders’ tunneling incentives on debt 
financing decisions. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  We discuss the sample construction 
process and variable definitions in Section 2.  Section 3 presents the empirical results from the 
baseline regressions, the robustness checks, and the finer tests focusing on the interaction 
between ownership structure and various other factors.  We conclude the paper in Section 4. 
 
2. Data and variables 
 
2.1. Sample construction 
 
To investigate the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its choice between bank and 
public debt, we assemble a large international data set on corporate ownership, control, and debt 
structures.  Our sample construction process starts with the Capital IQ database, which provides 
extensive financial data on over 50,000 public and private firms around the world.  From Capital 
IQ, we obtain detailed information on the debt structure, including the types of debt and the 
amount for each type, along with other relevant financial data, for all public firms with nonzero 
debt in 20 East Asian and Western European countries from 2001 to 2010.9  The 20 countries are: 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
                                                            
9 The Capital IQ database categorizes the total debt into various types such as term loans, credit lines, senior 
bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, commercial paper, capital leases, and other debt.  We exclude from 
our sample firms in the financial and regulated utilities industries.   
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the United Kingdom.  We focus on these countries because firms in these regions are often 
controlled by large shareholders through pyramid structures or dual class shares, where the 
control-ownership divergence is prevalent and has significant effects on firm value and corporate 
outcomes (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lin et al., 2012).10  Following 
Houston and James (1996), we focus on publicly listed firms because these firms are most likely 
to find public debt financing feasible and, as a consequence, are most likely to confront the 
choice between bank debt and public debt.  
For each firm in the sample, we then hand-collect information on the ownership and control 
rights of its largest ultimate owner using the ORBIS database.  ORBIS provides direct ownership 
information for more than 50 million public and private firms around the world.  We supplement 
ORBIS with ownership information collected from FactSet and company annual reports.  For 
each firm, we map out the complete chain of corporate ownership by first identifying all the 
large shareholders of the firm, which are often corporations themselves, and then tracing each of 
these shareholders through multiple layers of ownership along the chain until we reach the 
ultimate ownership level.  An ultimate owner can be an individual, a family, a government, or a 
widely held corporation.  A firm is defined as widely held, i.e., having no large shareholders, if 
none of its owners has 10% or more of the voting rights (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999).11   
To be retained in the sample, a firm must have available debt and financial information 
from Capital IQ and complete ownership chain information from ORBIS.  We exclude firms 
with zero debt from the sample.  For our sample countries, less than 5% of firms in Capital IQ 
have zero debt.  Our final sample thus consists of 43,502 firm-year observations covering 9,831 
                                                            
10 Specifically, Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) show significant divergence in corporate 
ownership and control in 22 East Asian and Western European countries, including the 20 countries we study in this 
paper plus Indonesia and Philippines.  We start our sample construction process with the original 22 countries 
covered in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) and then require a country to have a bond market 
capitalization-to-GDP ratio of at least 10% to be retained in the sample.  Indonesia and Philippines are thus 
eliminated from our sample because they do not have well-developed bond markets (i.e., bond market 
capitalization/GDP < 10%). 
 
11 Using alternative thresholds, such as 15% or 20%, does not materially alter our results. 
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firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010.  The number of firms per country ranges from 41 in 
Portugal to 2,613 in Japan, with a sample average of 492.   
 
2.2. The control-ownership divergence of the largest ultimate owner 
 
Mapping out the complete ownership chain for each sample firm allows us to clearly 
identify all ultimate owners of the firm and compute their respective cash-flow rights and control 
rights, including both the direct and the indirect rights.  The direct rights of an ultimate owner are 
based on direct ownership of shares held under the owner’s name.  The indirect rights are 
afforded by shares held by other entities along the ownership chain controlled by the ultimate 
owner.  Indirect cash-flow rights and control rights are calculated according to the standard 
definitions in the ownership literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000).  Indirect cash-flow rights are 
calculated as the product of cash-flow ownership stakes along the ownership chain.  Indirect 
control rights are measured by the weakest link in the chain of control rights.  For example, if 
firm A owns 20% of the shares of firm B which, in turn, owns 15% of the shares of firm C, then 
firm A’s indirect cash-flow rights and indirect control rights in firm C are 3% (=20%×15%) and 
15% (=min(20%, 15%)), respectively.  Summing up an ultimate owner’s direct and indirect cash-
flow (control) rights yields its aggregate cash-flow (control) rights.  The largest ultimate owner is 
defined as the ultimate owner with the greatest aggregate control rights. 
To capture the degree of control-ownership divergence in a firm’s ownership structure, we 
define our key measure, the control-ownership wedge, as the difference between the control 
rights and the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.12  The larger a firm’s 
wedge, the greater deviation there is between ownership and control at the firm and, 
                                                            
12 This definition follows previous studies in the ownership literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et 
al., 2000; Lin et al., 2012).  By definition, the control-ownership wedge equals zero for widely held firms.  
Alternatively, using the ratio of control rights to cash-flow rights to capture the control-ownership divergence 
produces robust results. 
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consequently, the greater the incentives of the controlling shareholders are to engage in tunneling 
and other moral hazard activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000). 
 
2.3. Debt structure 
 
For each sample firm, Capital IQ reports its total debt as well as the types of debt and the 
amount for each type.  Total debt is the sum of all types of debt, including term loans, revolving 
credit, senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, commercial paper, capital leases, 
and other debt.   
To study the choice between bank debt and public debt, we use the debt structure 
information from Capital IQ to construct two measures: the ratio of bank debt to total debt and 
the ratio of public debt to total debt.  Bank debt is defined as the sum of term loans and revolving 
credit, and public debt is defined as the sum of senior bonds and notes, subordinated bonds and 
notes, and commercial papers.  These two measures allow us to assess the importance of bank 
debt and public debt, respectively, in a firm’s debt financing.13   Our results are robust to 
excluding capital leases and other debt from total debt when constructing these measures.  
Variations in the bank debt ratio come from both across countries and within country, with a 
cross-country standard deviation of 0.065 and a within-country standard deviation of 0.355.  The 
ratio of public debt to total debt has a cross-country standard deviation of 0.058 and a within-
country standard deviation of 0.258.14  These statistics indicate the potential importance of 
within-country factors, such as firm ownership structure, in determining debt choice.   
                                                            
13 As an alternative way to capture the mix of bank and public debt in a firm’s debt structure, we also calculate 
the ratio of public debt to bank debt for all sample firms with nonzero bank debt.  All three measures of debt choice 
produce highly robust and consistent results in all of our empirical analyses.  For brevity, we only report the 
empirical results based on the bank debt ratio.  Results based on the other measures are not tabulated in the paper but 
are available upon request.     
 
14 Following previous cross-country studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2000), we calculate the cross-country standard 
deviation from country averages and the within-country standard deviation using the deviations from country 
averages.  Approximately 50% of firms in our sample do not rely on public debt financing.   
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In addition to debt source, we also explore the impact of the control-ownership wedge on 
two other aspects of debt structure: debt maturity and security.  Following the literature (e.g., 
Johnson, 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Billett et al., 2007), we use two alternative variables to 
measure debt maturity: the proportion of total debt maturing in more than 3 years, and the 
proportion of total debt maturing in more than 5 years.  Security is defined as the proportion of 
total debt secured by collateral. 
 
2.4. Control variables  
 
In examining the relation between corporate ownership structure and debt structure, we 
control for differences in various firm characteristics including firm size, leverage, profitability, 
Q, asset tangibility, and default risk.15  To account for possible differences and changes in the 
reliance on a particular type of debt through time and across industries and countries, we also 
control for year, industry (based on the Fama-French 48-industry classification), and country 
fixed effects in our analyses. 
Table 1A provides the detailed definitions for all of the variables used in the paper, and 
Table 1B reports summary statistics for the sample.  The descriptive statistics for the debt 
structure and ownership structure variables are largely in line with the previous literature (e.g., 
Houston and James, 1996; Laeven and Levine, 2008).    
[Insert Tables 1A and 1B here] 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. The effect of corporate ownership structure on the choice of debt source 
                                                            
15 To avoid potential problems with outliers, all variables in the paper are winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% 
levels.     
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In this section, we investigate the relation between a firm’s ownership structure and its 
choice of debt.  Before conducting regression analyses, to get a visual sense about the relation 
between control-ownership divergence and debt choice, we first construct country-by-country 
scatter plots, with the control-ownership wedge on the x-axis and the ratio of bank debt to total 
debt on the y-axis (Figure 1).  In these plots, we can observe a clear, negative relation between 
control-ownership divergence and bank debt reliance.  This strong relationship is consistent 
across countries and does not appear to be driven by outliers.16   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We then examine the relation between ownership structure and debt choice using 
multivariate analysis.  We estimate the following regression model: 
Debt choice measure = f(Control-ownership wedge, Firm controls, Year, industry, and 
country effects).                      (1) 
In the regression, the dependent variable is a debt choice measure, capturing a firm’s 
reliance on bank debt or public debt in its debt financing.  The key independent variable is the 
control-ownership wedge, which captures the degree of the separation of ownership and control 
in the firm’s ownership structure.  We control for the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
owner as well as a set of other firm characteristics that may influence the choice of debt source.  
In addition, we include year, industry, and country fixed effects.   
The regression results of estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table 2.  The dependent 
variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  We run three specifications.  The first two are 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  Following Houston and James (1996), we also 
estimate a third specification in which we estimate Tobit regressions, because the dependent 
                                                            
16 We also compare the debt composition between firms at the top of pyramids and firms at the bottom of 
pyramids.  Consistently, we find that firms at the top of pyramids rely more on bank debt financing than firms at the 
bottom of pyramids.  The proportion of bank debt in total debt is approximately 20% higher for firms at the top of 
pyramids than for firms at the bottom of pyramids.  In contrast, firms at the bottom of pyramids have approximately 
30% more public debt in their debt composition compared to firms at the top of pyramids. 
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variables are proportions and are thus constrained.17  We include industry fixed effects and 
country×year fixed effects in all specifications.18  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The results in Table 2 show that there is a negative and significant relationship between the 
proportion of bank financing in a firm’s debt structure and the degree of the separation of 
ownership and control in the firm’s ownership structure.  The coefficient on the control-
ownership wedge is negative and statistically significant across all specifications.  Based on the 
estimates from Column 2, a one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership wedge 
reduces the ratio of bank debt to total debt by more than 16 percentage points, everything else 
equal.  This effect is also economically significant given the sample average bank debt to total 
debt ratio of 71%.     
In contrast, we find that the control-ownership divergence is positively related to the 
proportion of public debt (unreported but available upon request).  In a specification similar to 
Column 2 but with the ratio of public debt to total debt as the dependent variable, we find that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the control-ownership wedge increases the ratio of public debt 
to total debt by 2.9 percentage points, representing a 20% increase over the sample average 
public debt to total debt ratio of 15%.   
Regarding the control variables, we find that larger firms, more profitable firms, firms with 
higher leverage, and firms with higher asset tangibility tend to rely less on bank debt and more 
on public debt.  These findings are consistent with those reported in previous studies (e.g., 
Houston and James, 1996; Denis and Mihov, 2003).  
                                                            
17 Specifically, we run pooled Tobit regressions (Wooldridge, 2002) and report the estimated marginal effects. 
 
18 We have also run specifications with year, industry, and country fixed effects as well as specifications with 
country fixed effects and industry×year fixed effects and obtained qualitatively and quantitatively similar results for 
all of our empirical analyses.  For brevity, these results are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Overall, these results indicate that firms with wider divergences between controlling 
shareholders’ cash-flow rights and control rights tend to rely more heavily on public debt 
financing and less on bank debt financing.  As a firm’s control-ownership wedge increases, the 
proportion of bank debt in the firm’s debt financing decreases while the firm’s reliance on public 
debt increases.  The relationship between a firm’s control-ownership divergence and its choice 
between bank debt and public debt is consistent with the hypothesis that firms controlled by 
large shareholders with excess control rights choose public debt financing over bank debt as a 
way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring. 
 
3.2. Sharper tests of the monitoring avoidance hypothesis 
  
 The positive link between a firm’s control-ownership wedge and its reliance on public debt 
in place of bank debt is consistent with the prediction of the monitoring avoidance hypothesis.  
In this section, we further test the monitoring avoidance hypothesis by exploring whether the 
effect of the control-ownership wedge on firm debt choice is influenced by factors that affect the 
dominant shareholder’s incentive to elude monitoring.  The monitoring avoidance hypothesis 
predicts that the negative relationship between a firm’s control-ownership wedge and its reliance 
on bank debt should be particularly strong in situations where the control-ownership divergence 
is more likely to result in intensive monitoring from banks.  Similarly, the monitoring avoidance 
effect should also be more pronounced in the presence of factors that heighten the dominant 
shareholder’s tunneling incentives and, as a consequence, the incentive to avoid bank monitoring.  
Conversely, factors that reduce the tunneling incentives and thus the monitoring avoidance 
incentives of the controlling shareholder should weaken the effect of the control-ownership 
wedge on bank debt reliance.   
 The factors that we examine include financial distress risk, information opacity, family 
ownership, the presence of multiple large shareholders, and the strength of shareholder rights.  
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Empirically, we implement these finer tests by augmenting our baseline model to include the 
factor under study and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge.  In addition to providing 
further evidence on the monitoring avoidance hypothesis, examining the interaction effects help 
to shed light on the channels through which tunneling incentives and the ensuing incentives to 
elude monitoring induced by the separation of ownership and control can be mitigated or 
exacerbated.     
 
3.2.1. Financial distress risk 
  
 As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others have noted, when firms are in financial distress, 
asset substitution and moral hazard issues become particularly strong concerns to creditors.  As a 
consequence, banks are more likely to impose intensive and strict monitoring over firms with 
high financial distress risk (e.g., Campello et al., 2011).  At the same time, empirical evidence 
suggests that controlling shareholders’ tunneling incentives are heightened during financial 
distress, resulting in rampant moral hazard activities in distressed firms with divergence between 
ownership and control (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000).  Therefore, when firms have high financial 
distress risk, large shareholders with excess control rights have particularly strong incentives to 
avoid bank monitoring, which would make tunneling more difficult, and to rely instead on public 
debt financing.  In other words, we expect firm financial distress risk to accentuate the link 
between the control-ownership wedge and firm debt choice.   
 We use two alternative variables to measure a firm’s financial distress risk.  Z-score 
(Altman, 1968) is an accounting-based measure that captures the financial health of a company, 
and Distance to default (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) is a market-based measure that estimates the 
likelihood that the market value of a firm’s assets will stay above its debt default threshold.19  
                                                            
19 Specifically, Distance to default is calculated as the difference between the estimated market value of assets 
and the debt default threshold, divided by the product of the market value of assets and asset volatility.  The detailed 
definitions and estimation methodologies for Z-score and Distance to default are reported in Table 1A. 
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For both measures, higher values indicate better financial health and lower financial distress and 
default risk.  Table 3 presents the regression results for models including the financial distress 
risk measure and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge.  The dependent variable is the 
ratio of bank debt to total debt. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 As can be seen from the table, Z-score and Distance to default are negatively and 
significantly related to the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  These effects are consistent with the 
existing evidence in the literature that firms with high distress risk tend to rely more on bank 
debt (e.g., Denis and Mihov, 2003), since bank debt financing is associated with higher 
renegotiation efficiency and re-contracting flexibility during financial distress (Gilson et al., 
1990; Thakor and Wilson, 1995).  More important, the interaction terms between the financial 
distress risk measures and the control-ownership wedge are consistently positive and significant.  
This indicates that the effect of ownership structure on bank debt reliance is weaker in firms with 
better financial health.  The results in Table 3 suggest that monitoring avoidance incentives 
induced by the control-ownership divergence are more powerful in financially distressed firms, 
resulting in a more pronounced effect of the control-ownership wedge on debt choice in these 
firms.20   
 
3.2.2. Information Opacity 
  
 The degree of information opacity of a firm may also affect its controlling shareholder’s 
incentive to avoid bank monitoring.  High information opacity lowers the costs and increases the 
likelihood of engaging in tunneling and other moral hazard activities by dominant shareholders 
                                                            
20  An alternative, consistent way to interpret the interaction effects is that the control-ownership wedge 
weakens the link between a firm’s financial distress risk and its reliance on bank debt because controlling 
shareholders with excess control rights have heightened incentives to avoid bank scrutiny and monitoring during 
financial distress. 
 
19 
 
and, at the same time, banks are likely to impose stricter monitoring on borrowers with greater 
information opacity (e.g., Lin et al., 2012).  In anticipation of the intensive monitoring from 
banks, opaque firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights have particularly 
strong incentives to rely more on public debt and less on bank debt in order to avoid bank 
scrutiny.  Therefore, the effect of the control-ownership wedge on bank debt reliance should be 
more pronounced for informationally opaque firms.   
 To empirically assess how information opacity affects the link between ownership structure 
and debt choice, we use multiple measures to proxy for the degree of firm information opacity.  
These include firm size, inclusion in a major national stock index, analyst coverage, and the 
volatility of accruals.21  Generally speaking, firms that are larger in size, that are part of major 
stock indices, that are widely followed by analysts, and that have less volatile accruals tend to be 
more transparent and have lower levels of information asymmetry.   
 Table 4 reports the estimates for regressions including the information opacity measures and 
their interaction terms with the control-ownership wedge variable in our baseline model, with the 
ratio of bank debt to total debt as the dependent variable. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Consistent with the existing literature, the coefficients on the information opacity proxies in 
Table 4 indicate that opaque firms tend to rely more on bank debt.  This suggests that banks 
possess comparative advantages over public investors in producing information (Fama, 1985) 
and pricing claims that are hard to value (Hadlock and James, 2002) when faced with high levels 
of information asymmetry.  It is more interesting, however, that the interaction effects indicate 
that information opacity indeed strengthens the relation between ownership structure and debt 
choice.  As can be seen from the estimates in Table 4, the effect of the control-ownership wedge 
on bank debt reliance is less pronounced for larger firms, firms included in major stock indices, 
                                                            
21  We estimate the volatility of accruals following the methodology in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
McNichols (2002).  The detailed definitions of the information opacity proxies are reported in Table 1A. 
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and firms followed by more analysts, and is more pronounced for firms with more volatile 
accruals.  Overall, these results support the monitoring avoidance hypothesis and indicate that 
the preference for public debt over bank debt at firms dominated by large shareholders with 
excess control rights is intensified by information opacity.22 
 
3.2.3. Family ownership 
  
 Next we examine the effect of the identity of the largest ultimate owner on the link between 
a firm’s control-ownership divergence and its debt choice, focusing on family ownership.  When 
a firm’s controlling shareholder is a family or an individual, the tunneling incentives induced by 
the separation of ownership and control may be particularly strong because the private benefits 
of control are not diluted among many unrelated investors (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  As a 
consequence, family-controlled firms might have sharpened incentives to avoid bank monitoring.  
Empirically, this means that the effect of the control-ownership divergence on firm debt choice 
should be greater for family-controlled firms. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 Table 5 reports the results of this investigation.  We define a dummy variable, Family 
ownership, that equals one if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is a family or an individual 
and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on the interaction between the family ownership dummy 
variable and the control-ownership wedge is significant at the 1% level and bears the same sign 
as the coefficient on the control-ownership wedge.  This indicates that the control-ownership 
divergence has a more depressing effect on bank debt reliance (as measured by the ratio of bank 
debt to total debt) for family-controlled firms than for other firms.  The estimates in Table 5 
show that, everything else equal, the effect of the control-ownership wedge on firm debt choice 
                                                            
22 Another consistent way to interpret the interaction results is that control-ownership divergence weakens the 
relation between information opacity and bank debt reliance due to controlling shareholders’ incentives to avoid 
bank monitoring. 
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is nearly twice as large in family-controlled firms as in other firms.  Consistent with our 
expectation, family ownership indeed strengthens the relation between ownership structure and 
debt choice. 
 
3.2.4. The presence of multiple large shareholders 
  
 Previous studies suggest that having multiple large shareholders enhances external 
monitoring (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  In particular, it is more difficult and less likely for 
the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits in the presence of another blockholder.  
Having other large owners, therefore, lowers the tunneling incentives of the controlling 
shareholder, and in turn, lowers his incentive to avoid bank monitoring.  We thus expect the 
presence of multiple large shareholders to weaken the relation between control-ownership 
divergence and firm debt choice.   
 To test this conjecture, we define a dummy variable, Multiple large owners, which equals 
one if the firm has at least one other owner that has 10% or more of the voting rights besides the 
ultimate largest owner.  Table 6 presents the results from estimating a regression that includes 
the Multiple large owners dummy and its interaction with the control-ownership wedge as 
additional independent variables. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 The results in Table 9 show that, consistent with the bank monitoring avoidance hypothesis, 
the effects of control-ownership divergence on bank debt reliance are mitigated by the presence 
of multiple large owners.  The coefficient on the interaction term between Multiple large owner 
and Control-ownership wedge is statistically significant and has the opposite sign of the 
coefficient on Control-ownership wedge.  Ceteris paribus, having another large shareholder 
reduces the effect of the control-ownership wedge on the ratio of bank debt to total debt by 
approximately a third.  
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3.2.5. Shareholder rights 
  
 A country’s legal environment may also affect the relation between corporate ownership 
structure and firm debt choice.  We focus on shareholder rights, which offer minority 
shareholders legal protection against controlling shareholders’ potential expropriation activities.  
Strong shareholder rights protection reduces large shareholders’ tunneling incentives and, 
consequently, reduces their incentives to avoid bank monitoring.  Therefore, the effect of 
control-ownership divergence on bank debt reliance should be smaller for firms in countries with 
better shareholder rights protection. 
 We use the Anti-self-dealing index and the Anti-director index as proxies for the level of 
shareholder rights protection in a country (Djankov et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998).  Higher 
index values indicate higher levels of investor protection against self-dealing by controlling 
shareholders and corporate insiders.23  We include these shareholder rights measures and their 
respective interactions with the control-ownership wedge in our baseline model and report the 
regression results in Table 7.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 Consistent with our expectation, shareholder rights protection has a significant moderating 
effect on the relation between control-ownership divergence and debt choice.  The control-
ownership wedge has a more depressing effect on bank debt reliance for firms in countries with 
weaker shareholder rights (lower index values).  These results highlight the importance of law 
and institutions in alleviating moral hazard problems and mitigating the distortions in firm 
financing choices caused by controlling shareholders’ tunneling incentives. 
 
3.3. Robustness 
                                                            
23 Detailed definitions of the indices are provided in Table 1A. 
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3.3.1. Propping 
  
 Our analyses so far focus on controlling shareholders’ tunneling and monitoring avoidance 
incentives in explaining firm debt choice.  However, controlling shareholders’ propping 
incentives may also affect borrowing firms’ reliance on bank debt versus public debt.  
Specifically, controlling shareholders in an ownership chain may have incentives to prop up a 
financially distressed firm to preserve their options to expropriate funds from the firm in the 
future (Friedman et al., 2003).  Propping is carried out mainly through capital and resource 
transfers from other firms under the controlling shareholders’ control, normally from firms in 
which the controlling shareholders have low cash-flow rights (i.e., firms low down in the 
ownership chain) to firms in which they have high cash-flow rights (i.e., firms high up in the 
ownership chain) (Bertrand et al., 2002).  In such cases, firms with controlling shareholders may 
find the benefits associated with bank debt financing such as renegotiation efficiency and re-
contracting flexibility during financial distress (e.g., Gilson et al., 1990; Denis and Mihov, 2003) 
less valuable, and as a result, find bank debt less attractive.   
 To take the propping incentives into consideration and check the robustness of our main 
results, we follow the recent ownership literature (Lin et al., 2011) and construct two measures to 
proxy for a borrowing firm’s potential of being propped up.  Intuitively, these measures estimate 
the assets that could potentially be used to prop the firm up.  For each borrowing firm, the first 
measure is calculated as the total value of assets of all firms that are positioned underneath the 
firm in the ownership chain, scaled by the firm’s assets.   Alternatively, we construct a second, 
more conservative measure by calculating the weighted sum of the asset values of all firms lower 
down in the ownership chain (scaled by the borrowing firm’s assets).  The weight for each firm 
beneath the borrowing firm is the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights in that firm.  
Using these propping measures and focusing on the sample of firms belonging to pyramids, we 
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test whether our main results continue to hold within pyramids after controlling for potential 
propping.  The empirical results are presented in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 In Columns 1 and 2, we control for a borrowing firm’s potential of being propped up in our 
baseline regression with the bank debt ratio as the dependent variable, using the first propping 
measure in Column 1 and the second propping measure in Column 2.  We find that the 
coefficients on the propping measures are significantly negative, suggesting that the potential of 
being propped up does make bank debt financing less attractive to borrowing firms.  The effect 
of the control-ownership wedge on bank debt reliance, however, remains economically and 
statistically significant after controlling for potential propping.  The coefficients on the control-
ownership wedge are significant at the 1% level in both columns and are of similar magnitudes 
as in the baseline regressions in Table 2.   
 Alternatively, we split the pyramid sample into firms with positive propping potentials and 
firms without propping potentials based on the propping measures and repeat the baseline 
regressions in the two subsamples.  These results are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8.  In 
each subsample, we continue to find that the control-ownership wedge exerts a negative and 
statistically significant impact on bank debt reliance, suggesting that our results are highly robust 
even in the subsample of firms that likely have no potential of being propped up.  The effect of 
the wedge is stronger in the subsample of firms without propping potentials.  This suggests that 
in anticipation of more intensive bank monitoring due to the lack of propping potentials, these 
firms have stronger monitoring avoidance incentives in deciding their debt choice.  In another set 
of tests (unreported for brevity but available upon request), we exclude firms with no controlling 
shareholders and focus only on firms that have controlling shareholders.  Intuitively, all the firms 
in this subsample are subject to potential propping, and we want to explore whether the control-
ownership divergence still has any explanatory power for debt choice for this group of firms.  
We find that the control-ownership wedge continues to exert a significantly negative impact on 
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bank debt reliance in the subsample.  Overall, these results show that our main finding remains 
highly robust after accounting for the potential propping incentives of the controlling 
shareholders. 
 
3.3.2. Level of Bank Debt 
  
 In this subsection we examine whether the level of existing bank debt in a firm’s debt 
structure affects the link between control-ownership divergence and bank debt reliance.  From 
the bank’s perspective, an increase in financial stake or credit exposure to the borrower generally 
enhances monitoring incentives (Sufi, 2007).  However, it is possible that for firms already with 
high levels of bank debt, the change in bank monitoring may not be very sensitive to the change 
in ownership structure because high-bank debt firms are already subject to strict bank monitoring.  
As a result, the link between control-ownership divergence and bank debt reliance may weaken 
as bank debt accumulates to the level beyond which banks’ incremental monitoring incentives 
diminish.  To test this hypothesis, we split our sample into two groups based on the sample 
median bank debt-to-total debt ratio and repeat the baseline regression in each subsample.  The 
results are reported in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 As can be seen from the table, the control-ownership wedge has a weaker effect on debt 
choice when the borrowing firm has a high bank debt ratio (Column 1).  The differences in the 
corresponding coefficients on the control-ownership wedge between the two subsamples are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Alternatively, we split the sample into firms with a bank 
debt ratio greater than 50% and firms with a bank debt ratio less than or equal to 50% and also 
find consistent results in the subsamples thus constructed.  For brevity, these results are not 
tabulated but are available from the authors. 
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3.3.3. Endogeneity of corporate ownership structure 
  
 Our baseline results are consistent with the monitoring avoidance hypothesis but they are 
subject to the criticism that some unobserved, omitted factor may affect both a firm’s ownership 
structure and its debt choice and thus bias the results.  To alleviate this concern, our baseline 
regressions include country and industry fixed effects as well as the year interaction (e.g., 
country×year) fixed effects to control for time-invariant and time-varying factors that may be 
driving the results.  Moreover, the results from the interaction term tests help to alleviate this 
concern as the interaction effects elucidate the mechanisms through which corporate ownership 
structure affects debt choice and are less likely to be subject to endogeneity problems.  In this 
subsection, we further address the endogeneity concerns using change regressions and 
instrumental variable regressions.  
 First, we use change regressions to examine the effect of a change in a firm’s control-
ownership wedge on the change in the firm’s debt choice.  If the firm-specific omitted 
characteristics that jointly affect ownership structure and debt choice are constant over time, 
focusing on changes controls for such time-invariant factors.  Table 10 presents the change 
regression results.  To be retained in the sample for the change regressions, a firm must have at 
least two firm-year observations in the sample for us to calculate the change variables and must 
have a nonzero change in its control-ownership wedge between the two periods.  The dependent 
variable in Table 10 is the change in the ratio of bank debt to total debt of the borrowing firm.  
The key independent variable is the change in the firm’s control-ownership wedge. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 The regression estimates in Table 10 corroborate our baseline results.  Controlling for 
changes in other firm characteristics, the change in the control-ownership wedge of a firm’s 
largest owner is positively related to the change in the proportion of public debt in the firm’s 
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debt structure but negatively related to the change in the proportion of bank financing in total 
debt.  All of the effects remain statistically significant at the 1% level. 
   We also estimate instrumental variable regressions.  In these regressions we instrument for 
each firm’s ownership structure using the initial industry average ownership structure in the 
firm’s country.  Previous studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lin et al., 2012) suggest that 
the initial average ownership structure in a firm’s industry is a reasonable instrument for the 
firm’s ownership structure, because an individual firm’s ownership structure is correlated with 
its industry average but it is unlikely that an individual firm’s current debt choice is directly 
driven by the historical industry average ownership structure other than through its effect on the 
firm’s own ownership structure.  Specifically, for each sample firm, we calculate the average 
cash-flow rights and average control-ownership wedge for all of the other firms in the same 
country and industry as the firm at the beginning of the sample.  We use these initial country-
specific industry averages as instruments for the firm’s cash-flow rights and control-ownership 
wedge, respectively.  Table 11 presents the regression results from the instrumental variable 
estimation.   
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 The results in Table 11 confirm that a firm’s control-ownership wedge significantly affects 
its choice of debt.  As the control-ownership wedge increases, the firm chooses to rely less on 
bank debt in its debt financing. 24   The coefficients on the control-ownership wedge are 
consistently significant at the 1% level across specifications, and their magnitudes are larger (in 
absolute value terms) compared to the corresponding estimates from the baseline OLS 
regressions.  In summary, after accounting for the potential issue of endogeneity using different 
approaches, we find that corporate ownership structure continues to have a statistically and 
economically significant impact on firm debt choice.  
                                                            
24 The instruments enter the first-stage regressions significantly at the 1% level, and the F-test of excluded 
instruments confirms that the instruments are valid.  The details are available upon request. 
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3.3.4. Additional robustness tests 
  
 We undertake several additional robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not driven 
by outliers or any specific country.  First, we test whether our regression results are driven by 
any specific country by replicating our main results in Table 2 omitting each country one at a 
time.  We also re-estimate the baseline regression in the subsample of Asian countries and in the 
subsample of European countries.  Additionally, we drop the 51 country-industry pairs in our 
sample with fewer than 10 observations and test the robustness of the results.  We find that our 
results are highly robust in all of the above tests.  The results of these robustness tests are not 
presented in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.  
 
3.4. Other aspects of debt structure: maturity and security  
    
 We have shown that the tunneling and monitoring avoidance incentives of the controlling 
shareholders induced by the divergence between ownership and control exert a significant impact 
on borrowing firms’ choice of debt source.  These incentives may also affect other aspects of 
debt structure.  In this section, we investigate the effect of control-ownership divergence on debt 
maturity and debt security.   
 As shown in the banking literature, both short debt maturity and high collateral requirements 
increase banks’ monitoring incentives and enhance monitoring intensity (Rajan and Winton, 
1995; Park, 2000; Stulz, 2000; Datta et al., 2005).  In anticipation of the heightened scrutiny 
induced by short maturity and high security requirements, firms controlled by large shareholders 
with excess control rights would choose a debt structure with long maturity and low levels of 
collateralization as a way of avoiding monitoring (Datta et al., 2005).  Moreover, bank debt tends 
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to have a much shorter maturity than public debt25 and is more often secured by collateral26.  
Given our main finding that borrowing firms with larger control-ownership wedges rely more on 
public debt in place of bank debt, we would also expect the wedge to be positively associated 
with maturity and negatively associated with security.  
 We present the results of our investigation in Table 12.  We focus on debt maturity in 
Columns 1 and 2.  The dependent variables are the proportion of total debt maturing in more than 
3 years in Column 1 and the proportion of total debt maturing in more than 5 years in Column 2.  
In Column 3, we examine debt security using the proportion of total debt secured by collateral as 
the dependent variable.  
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 As can be seen from the OLS regression estimates in Table 12, the control-ownership wedge 
has a significantly positive impact on debt maturity and a significantly negative impact on debt 
security.  Using the estimates from Column 2, everything else equal, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the control-ownership wedge is associated with an increase of 2.5% in the proportion 
of long-maturity debt in total debt, representing an 11% increase over the sample average long-
maturity (5+ years) debt proportion (22.3%).  In contrast, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the wedge is associated with a decrease in the debt collateralization ratio by 12% of the sample 
mean.  In short, the effects of the control-ownership divergence on debt maturity and security are 
significant both economically and statistically.  They are consistent with the monitoring 
avoidance hypothesis and corroborate our findings on debt source.   
 
4. Conclusion 
                                                            
25 See, e.g., Tufano (1993), Stoh and Mauer (1996), Johnson (1997), and Park (2000).  For instance, Johnson 
(1997) finds that debt maturity (measured by the proportion of debt maturing in more than three years) is 
significantly longer for firms using predominantly public debt than for firms using predominantly bank debt.  
 
26 See, e.g., Gilson and Warner (2000).  In our sample, secured bank debt represents 32% of total bank debt 
while secured public debt represents only 11% of the total public debt.  
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 There is rich empirical evidence suggesting that the divergence between ownership and 
control creates strong incentives for large shareholders to engage in tunneling and other moral 
hazard activities.  Yet little is known about how such incentives and activities induced by 
dominant shareholders’ excess control rights affect firm financing behavior.  The aim of this 
paper is to enhance our knowledge of these matters by examining the choice of debt source by 
firms with control-ownership divergences. Compared to public bondholders, banks can serve as 
more effective monitors in deterring potential self-dealing activities because of their 
concentrated holdings, strong bargaining power, and superior access to information.  As a 
consequence, firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights and hence strong 
tunneling incentives may prefer public debt financing over bank debt as a way to evade scrutiny 
and insulate themselves from bank monitoring.   
 Our paper examines this bank monitoring avoidance hypothesis using a novel, hand-
collected data set on corporate ownership, control and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 
countries from 2001 to 2010.  We find strong evidence that the monitoring avoidance incentives 
induced by the separation of ownership and control exert a significant impact on the choice 
between bank debt and public debt.  Specifically, we find that the divergence between the control 
rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm’s controlling shareholder decreases its reliance 
on bank debt financing and increases its reliance on public debt financing significantly.  These 
effects are particularly pronounced for family-controlled firms, informationally opaque firms, 
and firms with high financial distress risk, and are weakened by the presence of multiple large 
owners and strong shareholder rights.  We also find that the control-ownership divergence of a 
borrowing firm’s dominant shareholder increases the firm’s debt maturity and decreases its debt 
collateralization significantly.  Collectively, our results identify ownership structure as an 
important determinant of firm debt structure and shed new light on a channel through which the 
31 
 
control-ownership divergence and the ensuing moral hazard incentives influence firm financial 
decisions.   
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Figure 1 
The relation between bank debt and control-ownership wedge across countries 
 
 This figure presents country-by-country scatter plots of the control-ownership wedge on the x-axis 
and the ratio of bank debt to total debt on the y-axis.  The solid line in each plot is the fitted bank debt-to-
total debt ratio.  For each sample firm, the control-ownership wedge and the bank debt-to-total debt ratio 
plotted are the average value of the firm’s control-ownership wedge and the average value of the firm’s 
bank debt-to-total debt ratio over the sample period, respectively. 
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Table 1A 
Variable definitions 
 
 This table provides definitions for all the variables used in the paper. 
 
Variable name Variable definition 
Debt structure  
Bank debt/Total debt The ratio of bank debt to total debt, calculated as the sum of term loans and 
revolving credit divided by total debt 
Public debt/Total debt The ratio of public debt to total debt, calculated as the sum of senior bonds 
and notes, subordinated bonds and notes, and commercial papers divided by 
total debt 
Debt maturity The ratio of long-term debt due after three (or five) years to total debt 
Debt security The ratio of total secured debt to total debt 
  
Ownership structure  
Control-ownership wedge The difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest 
ultimate owner of the firm 
Cash-flow rights The cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm 
Family ownership dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the largest ultimate owner of the firm is 
a family or an individual and zero otherwise 
Multiple large owners dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one other owner 
besides the ultimate largest owner that has 10% or more of the voting rights 
and zero otherwise 
  
Firm characteristics  
Leverage  The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total 
assets  
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets 
Log assets The natural log of total assets measured in millions of U.S. dollars 
Profitability  EBITDA divided by total assets 
Q The sum of market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total 
assets, where market value of equity equals price per share times the total 
number of shares outstanding, and book value of debt equals total assets 
minus book value of equity 
Distance to default A market-based measure of default risk operationalized in Crosbie and Bohn 
(2003), calculated as (Va − D)/(Vaσa), where Va is market value of assets, D is 
debt in current liabilities plus one half of long-term debt, and σa is one-year 
asset volatility.  The two unobservable variables, Va and σa, are estimated by 
solving the following Merton (1974) pricing model for a one-year time 
horizon (T=1) using the market value of equity (Ve), one-year equity 
volatility (σe), debt (D), and the three-month Treasury-bill rate (r): Ve = 
VaN(d1) − e-rDN(d2) and σe = N(d1)σaVa/Ve, where d1 = [ln(Va/D) + r + 
0.5σa2 ]/σa and d2 = d1 − σa. 
Z-score Altman’s (1968) Z-score, calculated as (1.2×working capital + 1.4×retained 
earnings + 3.3×EBIT + 0.999×sales)/total assets + 0.6×(market value of 
equity/book value of debt) 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Table 1A 
Variable definitions 
(Continued) 
 
Variable name Variable definition 
Stock index inclusion dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm is included in a major national 
stock index and zero otherwise 
Number of analysts The total number of stock analysts following the firm 
Volatility of accruals An empirical measure of accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; 
McNichols, 2002), defined as the standard deviation of the firm-level 
residuals from a pooled OLS regression of the change in working capital on 
past, present, and future operating cash flows, the change in sales, and the 
level of property, plant, and equipment (all variables scaled by total assets)  
Propping potential The total value of the assets of all firms that are positioned below the 
borrowing firm in the ownership chain, divided by the borrowing firm’s total 
assets (upper bound measure); or a weighted sum of the asset values of all 
firms lower down in the ownership chain divided by the borrowing firm’s 
total assets, with the weight for each firm beneath the borrowing firm defined 
as the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights in that firm 
(conservative measure)
  
Other  
Anti-self-dealing An index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) with the help of Lex Mundi law 
firms that measures legal protection of minority shareholders against self-
dealing, with higher values indicating stronger protection 
Anti-director An index compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) 
aggregating shareholder rights concerning voting and minority protection.  
The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating stronger 
protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation. 
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Table 1B 
Summary statistics 
 
 This table reports the mean, standard deviation (STD), and number of observations (N) for 
all the variables used in the paper.  Definitions of all the variables are provided in Table 1A. 
 
 
Variable names Mean STD N 
Debt structure    
Bank debt/Total debt 0.714 0.361 43,502 
Public debt/Total debt 0.148 0.271 43,502 
Debt maturity (due after 3 years) 0.382 0.313 42,961 
Debt maturity (due after 5 years) 0.223 0.267 42,961 
Debt security 0.336 0.399 42,961 
 
Ownership structure    
Control-ownership wedge 0.042 0.077 43,502 
Cash-flow rights 0.214 0.218 43,502 
Family ownership dummy 0.278 0.448 43,502 
Multiple large owner dummy 0.298 0.457 43,502 
 
Firm characteristics    
Leverage 0.239 0.182 43,502 
Tangibility 0.401 0.241 43,502 
Log assets 5.221 1.940 43,502 
Profitability 0.077 0.119 43,502 
Q 1.233 0.764 43,502 
Distance to default 2.355 3.011 43,502 
Z-score  2.637 2.347 43,273 
Stock index inclusion dummy 0.076 0.265 43,502 
Number of analysts 5.240 9.007 43,502 
Volatility of accruals 0.133 0.121 41,169 
Propping potential (upper bound) 0.533 0.815 43,502  
Propping potential (conservative) 0.073 0.161 43,502  
 
Other    
Anti-director 3.927 0.820 43,502 
Anti-self-dealing 0.553 0.216 43,502 
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Table 2 
The effect of control-ownership wedge on the choice of debt source 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of the control-ownership wedge on the choice of 
debt source.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  We estimate ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions in Columns 1 and 2 and a Tobit regression in Column 3 (marginal effects 
reported).  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-
flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in 
Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS Tobit 
Control-ownership wedge -2.187 -2.104 -2.164 
(0.447)*** (0.681)*** (1.015)** 
Cash-flow rights 0.051 0.042 0.044 
(0.043) (0.040) (0.047) 
Leverage  -0.061 -0.087 
 (0.025)** (0.037)** 
Tangibility  -0.055 -0.072 
 (0.037) (0.047) 
Log assets  -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.015)** (0.014)** 
Profitability  -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.001)** (0.002)* 
Q  -0.037 -0.042 
 (0.017)** (0.017)** 
Distance to default  -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.010)** (0.009)** 
    
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 43,502 43,502 43,502 
Number of firms 9,831 9,831 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.129 
Pseudo R2  0.123 
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Table 3 
Financial distress risk and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on debt choice 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of firm financial distress risk on the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt 
to total debt.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and 
cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Z-score (Altman, 1968) is an accounting-based 
measure that captures the financial health of a company.  Distance to default (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) is 
a market-based measure that estimates the likelihood that the market value of a firm’s assets will stay 
above its debt default threshold.  Detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
 
(1) (2) 
Control-ownership wedge -2.487 -2.527 
(0.843)*** (0.809)*** 
Z-score -5.817 
(2.367)** 
Z-score × Wedge 0.264 
(0.105)** 
Distance to default -0.038 
(0.015)** 
Distance to default × Wedge 0.211 
(0.090)** 
Cash-flow rights 0.014 0.012 
(0.017) (0.014) 
Leverage -0.088 -0.047 
(0.035)** (0.021)** 
Tangibility -0.051 -0.069 
(0.025)** (0.038)* 
Log assets -0.042 -0.031 
(0.017)** (0.014)** 
Profitability -0.003 -0.004 
(0.002)* (0.002)** 
Q -0.049 -0.033 
(0.023)** (0.016)** 
   
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 43,273 43,502 
Number of firms 9,783 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.129 
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Table 4 
Information opacity and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on debt choice 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of firm information opacity on the relation 
between the control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt 
to total debt.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and 
cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Stock index inclusion is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm is included in a major national stock index and zero otherwise.  Number of analysts 
is the total number of stock analysts following the firm.  Volatility of accruals is an empirical measure of 
accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; McNichols, 2002).  Detailed definitions of all the variables 
are reported in Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control-ownership wedge -2.724 -2.185 -2.194 -1.875 
(0.538)*** (0.762)*** (0.905)** (0.636)*** 
Log assets -0.044 -0.038 -0.041 -0.037 
(0.017)** (0.016)** (0.018)** (0.016)** 
Log assets × Wedge 0.116 
(0.053)** 
Stock index inclusion -0.179 
(0.078)** 
Stock index inclusion × Wedge 0.887 
(0.270)*** 
Number of analysts -0.015 
(0.006)** 
Number of analysts × Wedge 0.062 
(0.028)** 
Volatility of accruals 0.479 
(0.201)** 
Volatility of accruals × Wedge -1.581 
(0.710)** 
Cash-flow rights 0.062 0.060 0.025 0.033 
(0.072) (0.075) (0.024) (0.039) 
Leverage -0.049 -0.033 -0.032 -0.053 
(0.021)** (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.022)** 
Tangibility -0.060 -0.066 -0.031 -0.021 
(0.027)** (0.031)** (0.023) (0.016) 
Profitability -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001) 
Q -0.010 -0.018 -0.020 -0.024 
(0.005)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.011)** 
Distance to default -0.020 -0.014 -0.018 -0.012 
(0.009)** (0.006)** (0.008)** (0.005)** 
     
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 43,502 43,502 43,502 41,169 
Number of firms 9,831 9,831 9,831 8,760 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.131 0.138 0.127 
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Table 5 
Family ownership and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on debt choice 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of family ownership on the relation between the 
control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  
The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Family ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
largest ultimate owner of the firm is a family or an individual and zero otherwise.  Definitions of all the 
other variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
 
Control-ownership wedge -1.604 
(0.560)*** 
Family ownership 0.012 
(0.010) 
Family ownership × Wedge -1.382 
(0.393)*** 
Cash-flow rights 0.051 
(0.062) 
Leverage -0.069 
(0.028)** 
Tangibility -0.044 
(0.033) 
Log assets -0.039 
(0.018)** 
Profitability -0.002 
(0.001) 
Q -0.023 
(0.010)** 
Distance to default -0.016 
(0.007)** 
  
Industry effects Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes 
Number of observations 43,502 
Number of firms 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.130 
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Table 6 
The presence of multiple large shareholders and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on 
debt choice 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of the presence of multiple large shareholders on 
the relation between the control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control 
rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Multiple large owners is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has at least one other owner besides the ultimate largest owner that has 
10% or more of the voting rights.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
 
Control-ownership wedge -2.281 
(0.773)*** 
Multiple large owners 0.007 
(0.008) 
Multiple large owners × Wedge 0.748 
(0.334)** 
Cash-flow rights 0.028 
(0.041) 
Leverage -0.075 
(0.033)** 
Tangibility -0.055 
(0.026)** 
Log assets -0.027 
(0.013)** 
Profitability -0.003 
(0.001)** 
Q -0.029 
(0.015)* 
Distance to default -0.022 
(0.010)** 
  
Industry effects Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes 
Number of observations 43,502 
Number of firms 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.129 
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Table 7 
Shareholder rights and the effect of the control-ownership wedge on debt choice 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of shareholder rights on the relation between the 
control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  
The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Anti-self-dealing is an index compiled by Djankov et al. (2008) 
that measures legal protection of minority shareholders against self-dealing.  Anti-director is an index 
compiled by La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) aggregating shareholder rights concerning 
voting and minority protection.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
 
    (1)      (2) 
Control-ownership wedge -2.696 -2.469 
(0.907)*** (0.823)*** 
Anti-self-dealing -0.098 
(0.042)** 
Anti-self-dealing × Wedge 0.481 
(0.176)*** 
Anti-director -0.023 
(0.015) 
Anti-director × Wedge 0.064 
(0.025)** 
Cash-flow rights 0.027 0.022 
(0.039) (0.025) 
Leverage -0.030 -0.031 
(0.013)** (0.014)** 
Tangibility -0.071 -0.077 
(0.039)* (0.037)** 
Log assets -0.012 -0.044 
(0.006)** (0.021)** 
Profitability -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001)** (0.001)* 
Q -0.034 -0.024 
(0.016)** (0.013)* 
Distance to default -0.019 -0.012 
(0.008)** (0.005)** 
   
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations  43,502 43,502 
Number of firms  9,831 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.071 
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Table 8 
Borrowing firm propping potential 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of propping potential on the relation between the control-
ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  The control-
ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate 
owner of the firm.  Propping potential is defined in Column 1 as the total value of the assets of all firms that are 
positioned below the borrowing firm in the ownership chain, divided by the borrowing firm’s total assets, and in 
Column 2 as a weighted sum of the asset values of all firms lower down in the ownership chain divided by the 
borrowing firm’s total assets, with the weight for each firm beneath the borrowing firm defined as the ultimate 
controlling shareholder’s control rights in that firm.  The sample used in Columns 1 and 2 include all firms belonging 
to pyramids.  We then split this pyramid sample into two subsamples: one consisting of firms whose propping 
potential is positive (Column 3) and the other consisting of firms whose propping potential is zero (Column 4).  
Detailed definitions of all the variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Pyramid  
sample 
 Pyramid  
sample 
 Positive propping 
potential 
 Zero propping 
potential 
Control-ownership wedge -2.801  -2.765  -2.164  -3.671 
(0.491)***  (0.513)***  (0.318)***  (0.461)*** 
Propping potential -0.128  -0.644     
(0.051)**  (0.243)***     
Cash-flow rights 0.022  0.020  0.047  0.018 
(0.031)  (0.024)  (0.050)  (0.020) 
Leverage -0.037  -0.032  -0.040  -0.029 
(0.016)**  (0.013)**  (0.017)**  (0.011)** 
Tangibility -0.061  -0.058  -0.067  -0.052 
(0.028)**  (0.039)  (0.048)  (0.035) 
Log assets -0.038  -0.037  -0.038  -0.032 
(0.016)**  (0.016)**  (0.016)**  (0.013)** 
Profitability -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Q -0.034  -0.028  -0.029  -0.035 
(0.015)**  (0.016)*  (0.013)**  (0.019)* 
Distance to default -0.018  -0.014  -0.022  -0.013 
(0.007)**  (0.006)**  (0.010)**  (0.005)** 
        
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 27,592  27,592  20,700  6,892 
Number of firms 6,514  6,514  4,424  2,244 
Adjusted R2 0.108  0.114  0.105  0.098 
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Table 9 
Level of bank debt 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of the level of bank debt on the relation between 
the control-ownership wedge and debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total 
debt.  We split our sample into two groups based on the sample median bank debt-to-total debt ratio.  The 
control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of 
the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1A.  
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
(1)  (2) 
 High bank debt ratio         Low bank debt ratio
Control-ownership wedge -1.601  -2.612 
(0.255)***  (0.310)*** 
Cash-flow rights 0.039  0.043 
(0.041)  (0.051) 
Leverage -0.048  -0.071 
(0.019)**  (0.029)** 
Tangibility -0.043  -0.067 
(0.028)  (0.043) 
Log assets -0.036  -0.031 
(0.015)**  (0.014)** 
Profitability -0.002  -0.003 
(0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Q -0.029  -0.048 
(0.014)**  (0.023)** 
Distance to default -0.022  -0.026 
(0.009)**  (0.011)** 
    
Industry effects Yes  Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 21,751  21,751 
Number of firms 7,117  6,347 
Adjusted R2 0.094  0.170 
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Table 10 
Change regressions 
 
 This table presents regression results on the effect of a change in a firm’s control-ownership wedge 
on the change in the firm’s debt structure.  The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of bank debt 
to total.  The control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-
flow rights of the largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in 
Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) 
ΔControl-ownership wedge -1.562 -1.418 
(0.416)*** (0.480)*** 
ΔCash-flow rights 0.021 0.017 
(0.039) (0.034) 
ΔLeverage  -0.035 
 (0.016)** 
ΔTangibility  -0.034 
 (0.024) 
ΔLog assets  -0.022 
 (0.010)** 
ΔProfitability  -0.003 
 (0.001)** 
ΔQ  -0.016 
 (0.007)** 
ΔDistance to default  -0.017 
 (0.008)** 
   
Number of observations 12,817 12,817 
Number of firms 3,841 3,841 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.091 
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Table 11 
Instrumental variable regressions 
 
 This table presents the instrumental variable regression results on the effect of the control-ownership 
wedge on debt choice.  The dependent variable is the ratio of bank debt to total debt.  The control-
ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
largest ultimate owner of the firm.  The instruments for the control-ownership wedge and cash-flow rights 
are the initial country-specific industry average wedge and average cash-flow rights, respectively.  
Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm 
are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.   
 
 
(1) (2) 
Control-ownership wedge -3.671 -3.368 
(0.486)*** (0.472)*** 
Cash-flow rights 0.052 0.049 
(0.067) (0.078) 
Leverage  -0.041 
 (0.017)** 
Tangibility  -0.073 
 (0.047) 
Log assets  -0.025 
 (0.011)** 
Profitability  -0.003 
 (0.001)** 
Q  -0.051 
 (0.022)** 
Distance to default  -0.024 
 (0.009)*** 
   
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 43,502 43,502 
Number of firms 9,831 9,831 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.129 
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Table 12 
The effect of control-ownership wedge on debt maturity and security 
 
 This table presents the OLS regression results on the effects of control-ownership wedge on debt 
maturity and on debt security.  The dependent variables are the proportion of total debt maturing in more 
than 3 years in Column 1 and the proportion of total debt maturing in more than 5 years in Column 2.  
The dependent variable in Column 3 is the proportion of total debt secured by collateral.  The control-
ownership wedge is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-flow rights of the 
largest ultimate owner of the firm.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1A.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 
Debt maturity 
(due after 3 years) 
Debt maturity 
(due after 5 years)  Debt security
Control-ownership wedge 0.538 0.320  -0.520 
(0.226)** (0.133)**  (0.221)** 
Cash-flow rights -0.056 -0.083  0.042 
(0.050) (0.084)  (0.045) 
Leverage 0.065 0.032  0.205 
(0.031)** (0.015)**  (0.093)** 
Tangibility 0.058 0.066  -0.164 
(0.031)* (0.030)**  (0.086)* 
Log assets 0.026 0.025  0.031 
(0.011)** (0.012)**  (0.014)** 
Profitability 0.022 0.015  -0.048 
(0.023) (0.017)  (0.028)* 
Q -0.013 -0.012  -0.043 
(0.007)* (0.005)**  (0.020)** 
Distance to default 0.003 0.005  -0.004 
(0.002)* (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
     
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Country × Time effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 42,961 42,961  42,961 
Number of firms 9,808 9,808  9,808 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.074  0.196 
 
